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Kashmir is a territorial dispute embedded in the politico-diplomatic events that 
shook the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The most immediate outcome of this 
dispute has been the human tragedy unfolding in Indian administered Kashmir, 
where a popular armed rebellion broke out in 1989. The brutalities of the rebellion 
reverberate across Kashmir, flashed in the common memories of people, especially 
the young who have been exposed to various socio-cultural vulnerabilities. Young 
Kashmiris have not known a stable and peaceful society and, therefore, rebelling 
has become part of the youth culture. They are politically hyper-engaged with more 
radical political views entailing revolutionary violence as a handy mechanism for 
preserving societal security, territorial fortification, and justice in Kashmir. 
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Introduction
Jammu and Kashmir—located in the great north-western Himalayan ranges—is 
a regional dispute deeply embedded and entangled in the varied interpretations 
of the politico-diplomatic events that shook the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The 
region is comprised of three natural divisions—Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh—
with diverse populations including Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs, 
which in turn represent multi-ethnic, multiracial, and multi-lingual groups with 
distinct and peculiar cultural ethoses. Consistent with the 2011 census, the three 
natural divisions of Jammu and Kashmir find reflection in religious disjuncture 
too. Jammu is largely Hindu and Sikh dominated (collectively 68.8 percent), the 
Ladakh region is largely populated by Buddhists (45.89 percent) and Muslims 
(47.4 percent), whilst the Valley of Kashmir is predominantly Muslim (97.16 
percent). Together, Muslims constitute 66.97 percent of the total population of 
Jammu and Kashmir, Hindus 29.63 percent, Sikh 2.03 percent, while Buddhists 
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comprise 1.36 percent. 
This cultural diversity in Jammu and Kashmir approximately mirrors 
the political aspirations of the people as well. By and large, the non-Muslim 
minorities want Kashmir as a part of India, while many Muslims want an 
independent secular Jammu and Kashmir or a Muslim Kashmir united with 
Pakistan (Raghunath 2006; Sonpar 2015). Jammu and Kashmir is also considered 
a geopolitically strategic position in the subcontinent, sharing borders with China 
to the east and northeast, Pakistan to the west and northwest, and India to the 
south; consequently, the region continues to be an unresolved issue between India 
and Pakistan specifically. While India affirms Jammu and Kashmir as an “integral 
part” of its territory (Singh 2017), Pakistan’s official position insists that Jammu 
and Kashmir is a “disputed territory” whose final status must be determined by 
the people of Kashmir.1 
Deeply involved in the rivalry of many great powers, this confrontation 
between India and Pakistan has been so intense and uncertain that Kashmir has 
been branded a “nuclear flash point” in South Asia, endangering almost a fifth of 
humanity. But the most immediate outcome of this confrontation is the human 
tragedy that has unfolded over past couple of decades in Indian administered 
Kashmir, where a popular armed rebellion broke out in 1989 to challenge India 
for denying the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination in order to shape their 
own future, as recognized in various United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions from 1948 to 1957. This rebellion, therefore, does not inculcate any 
new demand; rather along United Nation (UN) resolutions, it resonates the 
promise of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of independent India, when 
on November 2, 1947 he declared in a broadcast speech: “we are anxious not to 
finalize anything in a moment of crisis and without the fullest opportunity to be 
given to the people of Kashmir to have their say…The accession must be made by 
the people of that State…We will not and cannot back out of it” (Khan 2014, 16).
Nehru continued to declare in his public statements through 1951 that 
the fate of Kashmir would be determined by the people, and pledged to hold a 
referendum in Jammu and Kashmir under international auspices to enable the 
people to express their will—a promise that is yet to be fulfilled. Instead what has 
followed, especially during the last twenty-seven years of separatist insurgency in 
Indian-administered Kashmir and the Indian state’s response to it, is that tens of 
thousands of lives have been lost. As per reports of many local and international 
human rights watchdogs and newscasts, over 42,657 people have been killed in 
the Kashmir conflict (Mishra 2010; SATP 2018), while some non-official sources 
put this number at around 80,000. Thousands of youth disappeared in custody 
and there are thousands of unmarked graves in different parts of Kashmir (Iqbal, 
Hossain, and Mathur 2014). 
Such brutality reverberates across the valley of Kashmir, flashed in the 
common memories of people, especially the young who, as in all armed-conflict 
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zones, have been exposed to myriad socio-cultural vulnerabilities, risks, and 
impairments. They have not known a stable and peaceful society and, therefore, 
rebelling and revolting has become part of a bourgeoning number of young 
Kashmiris’ culture. The episodes of rebellion that engulfed Kashmir Valley in 
2008, 2009, 2010, and 2016 are illustrative of this trend wherein nearly 300 
youth were killed by Indian forces. Concomitantly, this turmoil led to further 
ambivalence in the already sensitive and precarious socio-political character of 
the Kashmir Valley and increased the trust deficit between people (mostly youth) 
and the Indian state.  
Under such precarious conditions, the victimization of Kashmiri youth by 
Indian security agencies may have different underlying motives, and perhaps 
some of their motives have to deal with what Samuel P. Huntington—author of 
the “Clash of Civilizations”—stated in an interview after the attacks on September 
11, 2001: “I don’t think Islam is any more violent than other religions…But the 
key factor is the demographic factor. Generally speaking, the people who go out 
and…[revolt for their rights and freedom]…are males between the ages of 16 and 
30. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, there were high birth-rates in the Muslim 
world, and this has given rise to a huge youth bulge” (Urdal 2006, 607).
Kashmir certainly has a youth bulge with over 40 percent of the population 
between the ages of ten and thirty-five. Indeed, if we are to believe the current 
estimates by demographers and economists, India is and will remain for 
some time one of the youngest countries in the world with over 41 percent of 
population below twenty years of age. Muslims in the country have the highest 
proportion of young (47 percent) among all religions (First Post 2016). This 
dividend is projected essentially to advantage India in the global economy. 
However, the literature also suggests that difficulties with identity formation and 
its huge potential for socio-political ambivalence are most likely to occur in young 
societies in transition. Huntington (2007) insists that societies are particularly 
war-prone when the number of young people aged fifteen to twenty-four reaches 
a “critical level” of 20 percent of the overall population. And if this segment of 
the population is left with no alternative but unemployment and poverty, they are 
likely to join radical movements (Bhat 2014, 472). However, the issue of political 
turmoil in Kashmir cannot be reduced to mere economic and demographic 
notions; rather, as aforesaid, this region is highly complex and dense involving a 
magnitude of socio-cultural, politico-economic, historical, religious, and psycho-
social juxtapositions that unintentionally provide a testing ground for Indian 
secularism, democracy, justice, freedom, and pluralism. Within this circle, the 
more the Indian government:  
Develop[s] the sense that they are fighting for their own supremacy with their backs 
against the wall, the more savage for the most part does their behaviour become and 
the more acute the danger that they will disregard and destroy the civilized standards 
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on which they pride themselves…With their backs against the wall, the champions [of 
civilization] easily become the greatest destroyers of civilization (Elias 1996, 358-359).
Hence, the pressing concern for India today is to locate possibilities to fairly 
integrate the Muslim youth bulge in the unfolding global post-modern culture, 
economy, and development, rather just victimizing them with labels such as 
“aggressive other.” A number of studies demonstrate that stigmatization and 
compartmentalizing Muslim youth in delineated surveillance spaces contributes 
to processes of radicalization, rebellion, and rioting (Epstein 2007; Spalek and 
Lambert 2008; Boukhars 2009; Vertigans 2010) and I would argue that such 
delineation of populations produce a multitude of dark sides for governments, 
and de-civilizing and dehumanizing elements for nations, as such stuff creeps 
into the common memories of the younger generations, given added resonance, 
and transmitted and internalized as “knowledge” (Vertigans 2010). Altogether, 
with growing acceptance of violence in public, there is a danger of denting the 
very basis of Indian socio-culture values, which are values of mutual tolerance, 
of accommodation and integration (Balasubramanian 1992; Vadekar 2002), 
comprising the basic norms of the Indian Constitution. With Kashmir as a 
hotspot, maintaining this longstanding secular culture, peace, and security is one 
of the key challenges facing India today.
With this understanding, this article seeks to explore and analyze the patterns 
of political engagement of young people in Kashmir, their trust in democratic 
institutions, their zones of anxieties, and concomitant trajectories. A brief section 
on methodology below is followed by an overview of the contemporary debate 
on youth and politics. The key arguments are then developed with an empirical 
analysis involving perceptions of Kashmiri youth to demonstrate the multiple 
meanings that politics and democracy have today for young people.
Method, Material, and Concepts 
This article is part of a wider research project.  One area of this project is about 
the perceptions of Kashmiri Muslim youth vis-à-vis politics, democracy, and 
governance. It is this element of the research that is explored in this article. The 
responses, therefore, provide a snapshot of the opinions and experiences of the 
Kashmiri youth rather than a generalized overview of the Muslim majority in 
Jammu and Kashmir.
Data collection took place between May 2015 and January 2016, with 
questionnaires administered proportionally to young people in the Srinagar, 
Anantnag, Baramulla, and Budgam districts of the Kashmir Valley. Beginning 
in Srinagar City, I administered questionnaires, originally drafted in English, 
to student youth followed by non-student youth. The same procedure was 
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implemented in Anantnag, Baramulla, and Budgam. At the selected research sites 
in Srinagar, I administered eighty questionnaires; equally eighty questionnaires 
were administered in Anantnag, Baramulla, and Budgam districts respectively. 
Altogether, 320 one-on-one questionnaires were administered to young people in 
the Kashmir Valley.
Since report writing was the final crucial part of this exercise, there is 
an array of technical, methodological, as well as theoretical repertoire to be 
addressed. As C. Wright Mills (1959) argues, neither the life of an individual nor 
the history of a society can be understood without understanding both. For that 
matter my key considerations throughout this article are clustered around: (1) 
the working argument as demonstrated in the introductory section; (2) empirical 
evidence; and (3) factual presentation of findings supported with archival sources, 
comprising the information collected from official records, media reports, and 
newscasts, etc. 
For the operational definition of the concept of youth, volumes of classical 
literature portray youth as: a value concept connoting a vital force; a source of 
renewal for the whole society; a category of chronological age; a segment in 
the lapse of the individual’s life; a stage of psycho-biological development; an 
element of social replacement; a stage in life marked by incomplete access to 
social positions; a marginal social category; and a constellation of ideologically 
homogeneous cohorts (Kuczynski et al. 1988, 6-7). On the underlying level, there 
is shared conjecture in this wide-ranging literature that youth is a phase of life 
which marks the “take-off ” from one stable state (childhood) to another stable 
state (adulthood), with youth as the stage in which the emerging adult tries on a 
variety of roles and ways of behaving in preparation for making critical choices. In 
these lines of thought, “youth” has become a widely debated and highly contested 
term over the last couple decades. As I have articulated elsewhere (Bhat 2013), the 
meanings that are now appended to youth reflect a variety of different aesthetic, 
political, and ideological positions. Notwithstanding, for the concept of youth, 
my focus in the present study was on both male and female youth. However, by 
“youth,” “the young,” or the “younger generation,” I mean the fifteen to thirty-
five-year age group, because when the current political attitudes or behavior can 
be traced to a particular past period, the connection often extends over the entire 
population (Schuman and Scott 1989, 360). Equally, for young people in Kashmir, 
politically their memories come specially from late 1980s when the separatist 
insurgency started in Kashmir. This gives an ideological distinctiveness and a 
common generational character to all the cohorts of youth born in the post-1980s 
period in Kashmir, and a majority of them are presently aged fifteen to thirty-five. 
204 Mohd. Aslam Bhat
Youth De-politicization and Youth Activism 
Many scholars have agreed that young people are rejecting institutional politics 
and becoming increasingly politically apathetic (Kimberlee 2002; Henn and 
Weinstein 2006). No longer are youth perceived as interested in conventional 
party campaigning, taking to streets asking people for votes and support, i.e. what 
their parents’ generations used to do. Such a transformation, typically captured 
under the remit “youth de-politicization,” has been addressed by scholars 
working across youth studies, sociology, and social sciences more broadly. Some 
scholars insist that the institutional isolation of most spheres of social life (Beck 
1999), the retreat of the welfare systems, and, most of all, their inability to cope 
with the increasing social and economic weakness of young people (Wallace 
and Kovatcheva 1998) have led to youth mistrust in bureaucracy and political 
institutions. Others demonstrate that formal or conventional politics is, by and 
large, clustered around the concerns and interests of adults with relative neglect 
of the specific needs of young people (Henn and Weinstein 2006). Still others 
emphasize that consumption-centred, hedonistic ethic, and egoistic youth 
cultures that encourage immediate enjoyment through leisure and consumer 
goods have diminished youths’ interest to involve themselves in collective issues 
(Harris, Wyn, and Younes 2010). 
Amidst this flow of explanations vis-à-vis de-politicization of youth, we are 
actually attuned to two broad reflections. First, young people are viewed in terms 
of what it means to live in globalizing times, which entails a regression in the 
coherence and certainty of once-established patterns of social (re)production, 
and a corresponding increase in individuals’ capacity for self-determination 
(Giddens 1991; Beck 1992). Precisely, it has been argued that new ways of life now 
require young people to “produce, stage and cobble together their biographies’ 
themselves” (Beck 1994, 13). That is to say that in both pre-modern and modern 
traditional social settings people acquired both sense of social order and of their 
having a settled, defined place in it, from the presence of established institutional 
pegs on which to hang their selves—their identities (Bhat 2013). Giddens (1991) 
calls this existential condition “ontological security,” the equanimity that comes 
from the certainty that your world is morally and socially well-organized and 
your place in it is secure. However, through the recent technological, economic, 
political, and cultural processes of radicalized modernization, this equanimity 
has disappeared. One of the major outcomes of this transformation, which I 
have discussed elsewhere, has been the exigency of the “reflexive-self-authored 
subject” (Bhat 2013) with transition to adulthood and formation of social identity 
largely interpreted as a more deliberate and reflexive endeavour accomplished in 
absence of the established social and political identities, which have increasingly 
become fragmented, less inclusive (Rossi 2009, 469), and relatively less relevant 
for individuals. 
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Second, these radicalized transformations have not only resulted in de-
politicization of youth, but have also directly affected their immediate life-
worlds, characterized by later entry into the labor market, delayed marriage and 
childbearing, increased prevalence of cohabiting unions, and more frequent 
divorce and proportionately more non-marital fertility (Fussell 2002). These 
trends not only have profound implications for young people themselves, but also 
posits a big challenge to societies at large. As young people delay forming families 
and fewer children are added to the population, the median age of the population 
rises (Yeung and Alipio 2013) resulting in population aging. So obviously, in such 
societies where elderly population exceeds the young population, formal politics 
would certainly be clustered more around the concerns and interests of adults, as 
Henn and Weinstein (2006) demonstrate.
Tied together, these reflections of the youth situation are most visible in 
late-modern-aging societies: Australia, North America, the United Kingdom, 
and Germany. Hence this “big picture” perspective must not blind us to the 
worldwide tendencies. Recently, contrasting perspectives are clustered around 
youths’ political experiences:
In the field of politics, young people show an uncertain and unstable combinatorial 
logic of interpretations, vocabularies and shared representations, just as they do in 
other aspects of their lives where uncertainty, temporary decisions, reflexivity and 
the constant search for justifications also predominate…Young people construct 
their political universes, giving top priority to links with their own experiences of 
transition, the need for biographic self-realisation and the search for specific results 
(Benedicto 2012, 726).
Specifically, the series of popular uprisings in the Arab world in 2011, which 
were partly fuelled by social media, highlighted the role of the young and their 
culture in organized political activism (Sawaf 2013; Staeheli and Nagel 2013). 
The events of this “Arab Spring” posit and provide a testing case for the youth de-
politicization thesis, because formal politics is no longer defined by activities like 
taking to streets, voting, etc., but rather young people may galvanize their cohorts 
by taking to cyberspaces’ and social media more broadly. Khalil (2012) underlines 
that “youth generated media” including Facebook, Twitter, blogs, graffiti, videos, 
songs, and other forms of communication developed and circulated by young 
people played an iconic role in protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and 
elsewhere in the Arab world, indeed proffering a new understanding of citizenry. 
Equally what we are witnessing in “post-reform India” is a particular 
articulation of youth politics wherein university is still a site for student politics 
played across caste and religious lines (Jeffrey and Young 2012). In fact, Kumar 
(2012) eloquently underlines that many young people in India attend university 
only to enter formal politics, thereby providing logistical support during party 
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campaigning, elections, and protest rallies. Particularly for lower caste young 
Indians, they respond to their social and economic exclusion by reaffirming their 
faith in party campaigning, figuring themselves as local political workers (Jeffrey, 
Jeffrey, and Jeffrey 2005).   
Conversely, however, the conflict-ridden Kashmiri youth display a genre 
of political interest reminiscent of the Arab Spring. From the 21-year-old rebel 
Burhan Wani, who was killed in June 2016, to university students, Kashmiri 
youth are on the cusp of change and they represent a multiplicity of aspirations 
and worldviews; however, they have a unanimous political will—the exercise of 
their right of self-determination. A decade ago, the situation was so muddled that it 
was problematic to discern whether the generation of Kashmiri youth involved in 
the turmoil were triggered by the disheartening socio-economic conditions and 
the political paradox characterized by denial of democracy and miss-governance, 
or whether these youths were influenced by the ideologies of groups outside 
Kashmir and so-called radical Islamic practices typical of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and Pakistan. Perhaps it was a blend of both. Today, however, with strong mass 
protests, open support of armed rebels, stone pelting, and social media generated 
communications, youth have given a different shape to the Kashmir conflict—
increasingly becoming a “mass civil movement” with every locality, village, town, 
and city equally involved. Hence, Kashmiri youth are not politically apathetic, 
they are hyper-engaged.   
Political Engagement and Trust in Democratic Institutions  
As elsewhere in conflict-zones, there are in everyday life of young Kashmiris’ an 
increasing array of vanguard as well as blurred signs and signals that guide their 
aspirations, anticipations, and future trajectories. Precisely, as Valentine and 
Sporton (2009, 736) argue that “it is through narratives that we constitute our 
social identities.” Equally, young Kashmiris’ pathways are informed and framed 
by the two immediate lived narratives from which they originate: a familial/class 
narrative that I have discussed elsewhere (Bhat and Rather 2013) and a conflict 
narrative characterized by political turmoil and miss-governance, which has 
surrounded them for last couple decades. Allied to this milieu is the overarching 
narrative of territory-based shared and collective identity termed Kashmiriyat—a 
sacred-secular merger often confused with Muslim identity.  
With these peculiarities, young Kashmiris’ are inheriting a world where 
besides the widespread and increasing trust deficit between people and the state, 
“the space of the street is often the only…[political] space that young people are 
able to carve out for themselves” (Valentine and Skelton 1998, 7). This tendency is 
largely observable in Figure 1 which displays the patterns of political engagements 
of young people in Kashmir. But such a magnitude of disinterest in conventional/
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formal politics is now greater than at any other point in the history of Kashmir. 
While village youth are still somewhat interested in conventional/formal politics 
with over 20 percent having voted at least once and nearly 19 percent having 
partaken in party campaigning, only 11 percent and 7 percent of town and city 
youth respectively have engaged in formal politics as defined by voting and party 
campaigning. A very small proportion reported to be members of any political 
group on or off campus. However, it is worth mentioning here that many of these 
young people confuse religious-cum-political organizations, like Jamaat-I-Islami, 
with political groups. 
The latest elections for Srinagar parliamentary constituencies held on April 
9, 2017 in the Srinagar, Budgam, and Gandarbal districts of the Kashmir Valley 
proffered solid evidence of the level of disinterest in conventional/formal politics 
among youth. The lowest ever voter turnout at 7.1 percent was recorded. But 
more to this by-poll was the magnitude of violence, with over 200 incidents of 
violent protests reported, wherein eight youth were killed by Indian forces and 
hundreds were injured.
Thus, in sharp contrast, the magnitude of youth participation in protests, 
social media campaigning, and partaking in general strikes, which comprise the 
unconventional type of politics, demonstrates that the “street” and “cyberspace” 
are increasingly accepted as the “politicalscape” that young people in Kashmir 
often use to articulate their political standpoints. While about 83 percent of 
Source: Author’s Field Survey
* This includes youth generated media developed and circulated by young people on Facebook, 
Twitter, blogs, and other cyberspaces.




Figure 1. Patterns of Political Engagements of Young People in Kashmir 
 
Source: Author 
*This includes youth generated media developed and circulated by young people on 
Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and other cyberspaces. 
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town youth reported to have participated in protests, the frequency for city and 
village youth stands at 71 and 63 percent respectively. By and large a similar 
trend is observable in terms of partaking in social media demonstrations and 
general strikes. Such disposition, in fact, displays a dramatic generational shift in 
Kashmir, with old norms and rules almost entirely now discarded by the youth, 
who with massive courage capitalize on every possible opportunity on the street 
and social media not only to express their dissent and maintain the collective 
sentiments at their necessary level of strength, but to reach the international 
community to reveal the magnitude of injustice, gross human rights violations, 
and stories of the torture they have suffered over the decades. 
Such patterns of political engagement have been interpreted under many 
rubrics such as “smarter citizenry,” “issue politics,” and “counter-democratic” 
participation. Rosanvallon (2008) argues that while partaking in “electoral-
representative” politics has dwindled, “counter-democratic” participation has 
increased significantly, which includes increasing use of informal powers and 
rights by common citizens to force governments, politicians, and the media 
to address their issues more seriously. Equally, other scholars insist that the 
incidence of distrust in a state is in essence a positive trend, connoting the 
emergence of a smarter citizenry (Norris 2002). Actually, the smart citizenry 
concept connotes that a good proportion of people across many countries believe 
that their vote actually makes no difference in how their country is run, as in 
India where over 34 percent of youth have such a feeling (DeSouza, Kumar, 
and Shastri 2009, 59). Concomitantly, people resort to other means (mostly 
e-channels) to comment, offer feedback, vote, rate, tweet, retweet, and petition 
individuals, organizations, and governments. 
Nonetheless, for young people in Kashmir, these concepts partly describe 
their political vantage points, since a majority of the youth in Kashmir do not 
trust Indian democracy, as discussed in the following. The notion of “issue 
politics” perhaps offers a glimpse of the young Kashmiris’ rational reaction to 
their belief that the so-called largest democracy in the world has undemocratically 
deprived them of their right to self-determination. Because it is often observed 
that whenever there has been any encroachment upon societal security in 
Kashmir, young people surge-up, politicize, and mobilize to express the decades 
long unresolved anger that Kashmiris have bottled up against the Indian 
government (Nazakat 2012). The episodes of widespread protests in Kashmir due 
to the Amarnath land transfer controversy in 2008, popular outrage over the rape 
and murder of two young sisters-in-law in the small town of Shopian in 2009, 
unrest in 2010 over the killing of three local teenage boys in the frontier district 
of Kupwara in northern Kashmir, and the turmoil which started on July 9, 2016 
over the suspicious incident involving a rebel named Burhan Wani, are illustrative 
in this stance.
Entailing revolutionary violence as a handy mechanism for preserving 
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societal security, territorial fortification, and justice in Kashmir, these episodes in 
fact mirror young Kashmiris’ scepticism about the strength and reach of the local 
government, which they call a puppet government, to preserve and work for the 
interests of the society, what Aijaz Wani (2011, 282) observes as adding “insult to 
injury, the state of Jammu and Kashmir…[is] selectively chosen for being an unfit 
constituency for democracy.” Indeed, as evident in Figure 2, none of the major 
Indian democratic institution hold the trust of the majority of young people 
in Kashmir. And there happens to be a slight difference in level of trust based 
on educational background. Only 19 percent of youth having university level 
education trust the local government in Kashmir, while for those who graduated 
from a college it is around 24 percent. Conversely, for young people who studied 
up to matriculation and those having received no formal education, the frequency 
of trust in local government is nearly 33 and 37 percent respectively. 
Though a dwindling trend now, there is trust among Kashmiri youth in 
the Hurriyat conference—the separatist party—specifically a few senior leaders 
whose calls for strikes and protests in Kashmir Valley usually receive a large 
response. The least trusted institutions are the army and police along with 
national Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government. Merely 9 percent young 
Kashmiris’ having university level education trust the national government, 
whereas for college graduates it is around 6 percent. Conversely, for young 
people having studied up to grade 10 and those who are illiterate, roughly 13 and 
16 percent respectively trust the national government, revealing altogether an 
inclination that the higher the educational level, the lower the level of trust, and 
the lower the educational level, the higher the level of trust in Indian democratic 
Source: Author’s Field Survey
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institutions. 
Unsurprisingly, the low level of trust in the army and police has to do with 
the atrocities committed by them over the last couple of decades in Kashmir, 
especially against youth. And it was the BJP-Left coalition led Jagmohan 
governorship in Jammu and Kashmir that in 1990 advocated “the bullet is the 
only solution for Kashmiris”—exactly what they did thereafter in Kashmir. 
Their policy in Kashmir was clustered around the generalization that “if you are 
a Kashmiri, you are a Muslim, you are pro-Pakistani, and you have to be dealt 
with accordingly” (Punjabi 1991, 84). Altogether, this fuelled the entire situation 
against India with common Kashmiris’ now actively supporting armed rebels 
(Behera 2002, 357-358). In fact, it is this policy, which historically informs much 
of the activities of Hindu nationalist fanatics, the BJP, its ideological mentor 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Overseas Friends of BJP (OFBJP), and BJP’s 
global front Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS), who follow communal lines to 
understand political realities with the sole purpose of creating in India a Hindu 
nation-state. 
The Constitution of India is clear, but secularity also means tolerance 
and societal security to minority groups. Violent attacks against Dalits, several 
incidents of lynching Muslims for trading cows or consuming beef, and 
forcing Muslims and Christians to convert: these types of incidents display the 
magnitude of anti-minority activities that the Indian polity witnessed especially 
since the BJP formed the Union government, and are contributing to derogatory 
perceptions of India as “pseudo secular nation.” A ban on consumption of beef 
and cow slaughter dates back to late nineteenth century in India and to Dogra 
rule in 1930 in Jammu and Kashmir. Memories of this ban were revived in 
1986 under the Governorship of Jagmohan in Kashmir. However, the “holy cow 
politics” under BJP leadership has led to heated controversy and political drama 
in the country with a growing sense of insecurity and fear among minorities, 
especially in northern India. This political environment is having a serious 
effect in Kashmir as a very negligible percentage of young people were found to 
have trust in the Indian variety of secularism as shown in Figure 2, and there is 
almost no difference in trust when correlated with the educational background of 
youth. In this sense, the latest episode of rebellion that has engulfed the Kashmir 
Valley since June 2016 may possibly be related to the anti-secular siege felt by the 
people, particularly the young Kashmiri, who want to give a fitting reply to Modi-
led Centralists that they are not scared of the Hinduvta brigade and are ready to 
counter any such nefarious designs. 
Equally, the Indian judiciary, election commission, and media do not seem 
to be trustworthy in the eyes of Kashmiri youth. The low trust in Indian judiciary 
is probably associated with the Masooda Parveen case of 2007, the Pathribal case 
of 2012, the execution of Afzal Guru in February 2013, and the overall denial of 
justice in everyday life. The Indian Supreme Court in its judgements has always 
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encouraged human rights violations by the military in Kashmir, with the Indian 
media leaving no stone unturned in misrepresentations of every such episode. 
Famed Indian activist Arundhati Roy (2005) underlines that the “Indian media 
is suffering from schizophrenia as its reports portray zero reflection about the 
reality in Kashmir. Indian media is busy painting a rosy picture of normalcy, 
which is absolutely false.” More precisely, the Indian media is habitually busy 
blaming Pakistan and Hurriyat (separatist) leaders for inciting the street protests 
while they deliberately avoid highlighting the magnitude of humanitarian crises 
in Kashmir for which the Indian army is entirely responsible. 
Zones of Anxiety and Concomitant Trajectories   
The evidence presented above clearly demonstrates that the wide scale of distrust 
of young people in Indian democratic institutions governing Kashmiri society is 
linked with the perception of their unsuccessfulness in addressing the significant 
social, economic, and political problems that have a direct bearing on the life 
trajectories of young people. This section deepens the analysis by studying 
the anxieties and problems that young people perceive and, therefore, cannot 
simply be ignored or their casual consequences denied in the total situation of 
Kashmir today. It is quite obvious from Figure 3 that unemployment, denial of 
justice and self-determination, and corruption emerge as the top three issues 
that young people consider to be the most crucial in Kashmir today. Certainly 
unemployment is an acute global problem (Mitra and Verick 2013). However, 
as aforesaid, if this dynamic demographic segment is left with no alternative but 
unemployment, they are likely to join underground and illegal movements (Urdal 
2004).
Nearly 40 percent of the Kashmiri population is between the ages of ten and 
thirty-five. The unemployment rate in the state is around 12 percent and there 
has been over a 13 percent increase in educational participation in the last decade 
(Government of India 2011), implying increases in post-compulsory education 
and, hence, mounting pressure on government jobs. This scenario along with the 
longstanding conflict situation and a strong feeling of being deprived of justice 
and self-determination, altogether gives an impression that Kashmir is a war-
prone society. In fact, outside ideologies and forces have been able to exploit the 
strong feelings of frustration and alienation that exist in Kashmir only because of 
the socio-political repercussions of the economic situation—unemployment—
and because of the perception on the part of many young people that the state is 
not interested in the establishment of widely accessible development.
Next to the denial of justice and self-determination, which as aforementioned 
is a longstanding issue in Kashmir, youth from villages, towns, and cities 
unanimously deem corruption to be the third most serious problem in the 
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state. Undoubtedly, corruption has a good deal of history in post-1947 Jammu 
and Kashmir. However, bribery, nepotism, and favoritism in the system of 
appointments, promotions, contracts, and licenses (Wani 2011) is a result of the 
strong nexus of bureaucracy, higher level business class, and politicians, and has 
escalated to unprecedented levels in last fifteen years or so, hampering not only 
widely accessible development, but also risking further the already sensitive 
and precarious socio-political situation in the state. Indeed, a number of studies 
conclude that unemployment and the corrupt administration are the driving 
forces behind the political turmoil and insurgency in Kashmir (Soz 1993; Prakash 
2000). But such conclusions should not blind us to other dimensions of reality 
by treating young Kashmiris as dopes reacting solely to their material conditions 
of existence. Nearly 76 percent of village youth consider societal insecurity a big 
problem in Kashmir, with 69 percent of town youth and 71 percent of city youth 
holding a similar perception. 
For the correct appreciation of this perception of Kashmiri youth, attention 
should be given to the concept of societal security, as first introduced by Barry 
Buzan (1991), which is concerned with the threats to the identity of society; just 
as state security is concerned with the sovereignty of the state. If a state loses its 
sovereignty it will not survive as a state. Equally, if a society loses its identity it 
will not survive as a society. So, societal security refers a sustainable management 
of traditional patterns of language, culture, national identity, and customs. 
Young people in Kashmir, therefore, are not merely apprehensive of threats 
to their material life like unemployment, but also of their territory based shared 
traditional-cultural-identity characterized by a sacred-secular merger widely 
Source: Author’s Field Survey
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known as Kashmiriyat. This unique identity of Kashmir is indeed guaranteed 
under Article 35A and Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. However, a series 
of threats has been posed over the last couple of decades to this unique identity 
of Kashmir, including the latest deliberations over the creation of separate 
colonies for emigrant Pandits (Hindus) in Kashmir, Garwaapsi (forcing Muslims 
and Christians to convert), issuance of permanent resident certificate (PRCs) in 
schools, creation of Sanik (army) colonies, and the transfer of ninety-nine acres 
of land to the Amarnath Shrine Board. Unsurprisingly, a majority of these threats 
were plotted under the auspices of the ultranationalists BJP which remains 
committed to changing the “state-subject” definition and the demographic profile 
of Kashmir, as well as abolishing Article 35A and Article 370, though observance 
of these articles has already eroded (Behera 2002). Nevertheless, on the occasion 
of every such plot, Kashmiri youth continue reacting to and protesting these 
nefarious designs. These demonstrations often turn violent and thus give an 
excuse to the state to use force and lethal weapons to silence these protesters. 
Problems like drug addiction and crime also affect the perceived threat to 
societal insecurity, because these social issues have a direct bearing on the norms 
and values of Kashmiri society. At times the issue of increasing drug addiction 
in Kashmir is taken as a conspiracy plotted by Indian intelligence agencies to 
corrupt the young people, while sometimes it is attributed to foreign hedonistic 
cultural influences. Perhaps it is a blend of both. Yet the situation is not that 
grim, at least for the cohort we investigated, since a majority of them displayed 
an objective understanding of their socio-political context, collective orientation, 
and reflexive awareness about these pathological conditions. The prerequisite, 
therefore, is to initiate practices aimed at mitigating or resolving such problems. 
In this context, questions were also asked about young Kashmiris’ opinion on the 
priorities on which the Central and State governments should primarily focus 
(Figure 4). 
Expectedly, these priorities for the most part are complementary to the 
perception of existing problems except terrorism, which does not emerge in the 
redressal priority list given in Figure 4. This is reminiscent of the perception of 
Indian youth at large, only 3 percent of them consider terrorism a big problem 
(DeSouza, Kumar, and Shastri 2009, 66). 
Notwithstanding, our discussion hitherto substantiates that none of the 
major Indian democratic institutions hold the trust of a majority of young people 
in Kashmir, who find themselves with no choice but to resort to revolutionary 
violence to articulate their political positions and defend their cultural identity. 
However, the way that unemployment, denial of justice, and perceived threats 
to societal security fuel the rebellion potential of the youth bulge in Kashmir 
is also strongly linked to the standard of education to which they have access. 
As noted in Figure 4, along with creation of employment opportunities and 
justice and self-determination, advanced education facilities emerge in the 
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top three priorities that young people recommend government should mainly 
focus on in Kashmir. Certainly, in the context of the new global order of late 
capitalism and post-modernity, advanced education facilities comprise the base 
of the development cycle. Specifically, for youth, the linear relationship between 
education, employment, psychological wellbeing, and youth development is 
debated in many different scientific contexts and from numerous perspectives 
which formulate youth life and educational life as two parallel and interacting 
pathways in the transition from youth to adulthood and in the formation of 
social identity (Erikson 1982; Winefield 2002; Morch 2003). But who is supposed 
to make available the conditions for this type of educational life to occur? 
Undeniably much depends on the capacity of the local government to realize that 
the youth bulge is not only democratically a destabilizing factor (see Weber 2012) 
but a “demographic gift” (Jayaram 2009) as well. However, the level to which 
Jammu and Kashmir can harness this “demographic gift” brings to forefront the 
quantity, quality, and relevance of education. The more high quality and advanced 
education facilities are available and accessible, the more likely this dynamic 
demographic segment is to convert into a pool of dynamic human capital. It has 
been widely confirmed that human capital plays an important role, especially 
during economic, political, and social transitions, in reducing corruption and 
fostering increasing participation in decision-making (Alesina and Perotti 1996), 
thereby increasing the prospects of prosperity, justice, and peace. 
Altogether, creating adequate facilities in the fields of advanced technical and 
vocational education that cater to improving employability of youth, preservation 
of local identity and culture, economic growth and development, as well as 
Source: Author’s Field Survey
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fighting crime and corruption are elements that should be a part of much needed 
pragmatism on the part of government. Most young people also find preservation 
of the natural environment, advanced health services, gender equality, and 
improved position of youth very important. This indicates that, despite the 
longstanding conflict situation in Kashmir, young people believe in a mixture of 
late-modern and post-modern values reminiscent of their changing attitudes and 
aspirations. Postmodern values give priority to environmental protection and 
cultural issues, and acceptance of centrally controlled bureaucratic institutions 
decreases with the rise of these values (Inglehart 2000, 222-224). While one may 
take it as an exaggeration to assert this about young Kashmiris’ specifically when 
we consider their desire to preserve their local identity and culture so important, 
but I would ask the reader to consider the public discourse in late-modern 
Europe, which has increasingly become culturalist and policy responses are 
increasingly colored by ideology (Boukhars 2009) and where youth still privilege 
ethno-national identities (Faas 2007). 
Concluding Thoughts
The values, aspirations, and anticipations of an individual or a group are 
structured by the total social and political context and by the specific generational 
experiences. For the post-eighties generation of Kashmir, these two combined 
influences—(1) the longstanding conflict-ridden society with many socio-
political issues; and (2) being the group that has suffered many brutalities during 
this conflict, the memory of which is seared into their minds—have resulted in a 
specific mode of political discourse, self-understanding, and patterns of political 
engagements. Such modes of behavior are manifest in their lack of interest in 
formal/conventional politics, a scepticism about the strength and reach of the 
local government, and distrust in the major Indian democratic institutions 
governing Kashmiri society. But this does not imply that Kashmiri youth are 
politically apathetic; instead they are politically hyper-engaged with more radical 
political views and they are potentially more inclined to participate in protests, 
social media campaigning, and partaking in general strikes, which are types of 
unconventional politics. Reasons for such an orientation among young Kashmiris 
are not parallel to “de-politicization,” nor to what some scholars associate with 
de-traditionalization, individualization, or consumption-centred hedonistic ethic 
and egoistic youth cultures. Rather, as debated in the foregoing, the “street” and 
“cyberspace” are the most accessible “politicalscape” in which the young people 
of Kashmir can espouse their political vantage points and to counter conspiracies 
plotted to encroach upon the unique identity of Kashmir guaranteed under 
Article 35A and Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.  
Such disposition, in fact, displays a dramatic generational shift in Kashmir, 
216 Mohd. Aslam Bhat
with old norms and rules almost entirely now discarded by the young who 
courageously capitalize on every possible opportunity on the street and social 
media not only to express their dissent and maintain the collective sentiments 
at their necessary level of strength, but to reach the international community 
to reveal the magnitude of injustice, gross human rights violations, and stories 
of torture they have suffered over the decades. Tragically, however, the “street” 
is not a hazard-free political site in Kashmir, very often proffering scenes of 
disaster, pain, and death. Specifically, since 2008, the street consumed over 350 
young people in Kashmir mostly between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five, with 
thousands suffering major injuries. Devastations during the latest turmoil, which 
started on July 9, 2016, are illustrative of this carnage, resulting in the deaths of 
nearly 100 youth by Indian forces, over 10,000 injured, and around 500 youth 
having gone blind due to pelts—a deadly weapon that Amnesty International 
declares should be banned but Indian forces continue to use to demean and 
devastate young lives in Kashmir.
The Kashmir conflict is more political than economic, more societal than 
demographic, more psychological and emotive than religious, and more secular 
than communal. This implies that voices of resistance and freedom in Kashmir 
cannot be silenced with so-called financial packages2 and by imposing an anti-
secular siege heightened by a series of aforementioned societal insecurities 
plotted under the influence of ultra-nationalist groups like the BJP, RSS, and Shiv 
Sena. It cannot be dissolved by imposing a demographic structure of classifying 
people in terms of religion, sect, and region, nor can it be suppressed with 
inhuman and ruthless martial tactics. In essence, these are altogether counter-
productive strategies close to the Emile Durkheim’s notion that to maintain the 
collective sentiment at their necessary level of strength, a certain amount of crime 
is inevitable and necessary. Equally, the more Indian political elite and military 
forces adopt and continue with brutal strategies in Kashmir, the more solid the 
social and cultural base will be for rebellion and revolt with increasing doubts 
among youth about the Indian state’s “integrationist” model.
Above all, with growing acceptance of violence in public, there is a danger of 
denting the very basis of Indian socio-culture values, which are values of mutual 
tolerance, accommodation, and integration (Balasubramanian 1992; Vadekar 
2002), comprising the basic norms of Indian Constitution. With Kashmir as a 
hotspot, maintaining this longstanding secular culture, peace, and security is one 
of the key challenges facing India today. To avoid a big mess—a vast amount of 
economic and human resource potential of India dragged into war—a complete 
stop to creating crude binary distinctions, wherein minority individuals and 
groups, especially Muslims, are referred as an “aggressive other,” is needed to 
resolve the Kashmir dispute as soon as possible. It was Albert Einstein, after 
all, who reminded us that problems cannot be solved with the same thinking 
that created them. Therefore, Kashmir needs a political package—a serious and 
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sincere political deliberation on the part of Centralists with a frame of justice and 
fair play. 
Correspondingly, one proposal suggests positively readdressing the 
combinatorial logic of political interpretations, vocabularies, and shared 
representations (Benedicto 2013) of young Kashmiris by, along with the creation 
of employment opportunities, justice, advanced educational facilities, and a fight 
against crime and corruption, making societal security as well as the preservation 
of local culture and the unique identity of Kashmir constitutionally guaranteed 
under the Article 35A and Article 370 the top priorities the Central and State 
governments as part of a pragmatic strategy. These undertakings would simply 
mean channelling and focusing attention on the needs and transformative 
potential of the “younger generation” into peacebuilding and development 
in Jammu and Kashmir. Young Kashmiris need to feel secure and a sense of 
belonging instead of being put under intensive surveillance and being made to 
feel a sense of “otherness.”  
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Notes
1.  Though Pakistan has been advocating for the settlement of the Kashmir issue in line 
with UN resolutions, this official stance has undergone some fundamental changes as 
reflected in President General Pervez Musharraf “four-point proposal,” which advocates 
“pondering outside the box” (Musharraf 2006, 302)—seeking settlement of the Kashmir 
dispute outside the UN framework (Hussain 2007).
2.  From Rajiv Gandhi’s INR$ 10,000 crore package in 1987, Deve Gowda’s INR$ 301 
crore package in 1996, AtalBihari Vajpayee’s INR$ 8,687 crore in 2002, Manmohan Singh’s 
INR$ 24,000 crore package in 2004, to the INR$ 80,000 crore financial package announced 
by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on November 2015, the government of India has been 
pumping money into Jammu and Kashmir, but not to bolster its economy. Rather the goal 
is to improve its own infrastructure and projects like the National Hydroelectric Power 
Corporation (NHPC), Railway and Border Roads, etc. As described by a noted local 
economist Professor Nissar Ali, “when money used by the Government of India for its own 
projects is sold as a financial package for Kashmir, how could those so-called packages 
have improved Kashmiri’s economy” (Yaseen 2015).
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